We analyse a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements. While the retailer's incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that he can earn, the supplier will choose to acquire information only if the retailer is rather well informed, even though the information is free of charge.
Introduction
Uncertainty about demand is a general phenomenon in markets for new products or in markets, where consumer preferences vary over time, e. g., markets for fashion goods. Similarly, exogenous demand shocks can lead to price fluctuations and thus expose firms to high economic risks. Information obtained from market research can reduce the firms' uncertainty. In supply chains the question arises whether suppliers and/or retailers want to acquire information about market demand. There are two main strategic issues involved: First, suppliers can use the contracts they offer to signal their private information. Second, retailers can increase their information rent, if they reduce their uncertainty.
We analyse a simple model with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about demand in a perfectly competitive market. The uncertainty is modelled as uncertainty about the price, at which the retailer can sell the supplier's product and which might be either high or low. The supplier and the retailer receive private signals about the price of the product. The precision of these signals, i. e., the probability with which they signal the actual price, can be chosen by each of the players. Although the signals themselves are private, we assume that the choices on signal precision are observable. The supplier offers contracts to the retailer, which each specifies a certain quantity and transfer. The contracts may depend on the supplier's private information, which has a signalling effect towards the retailer. The retailer chooses one of the offered contracts, given his own private signal, and sells the respective quantity at the actual market price.
In this model we focus on the analysis of the agents' incentives to acquire information. We show that there are two kinds of equilibria: one where only the retailer decides to get informed and one where both the supplier and the retailer choose to increase the precision of their signals. The first type of equilibrium is due to the fact that contracts, which credibly signal the supplier's private information to be a high price signal, are costly in the sense that the supplier has to distort the quantities he offers. Comparing the implied signalling costs with the potential gains from appropriating some of the retailer's information rent, the supplier decides to remain uninformed as long as the retailer's signal precision and thus his information rent is sufficiently small. By contrast and related to the second type of equilibrium, the supplier will choose to be informed, if the retailer's information rent is sufficiently high, i. e., if the retailer's signal precision is sufficiently high. Furthermore, we show that the information decisions of supplier and retailer are strategic complements such that they reinforce each other.
There is a vast literature on principal-agent models with endogenous information structure. Kessler (1998) analyses an agent's incentive to get informed before the contracting stage. Similar to our model, this paper shows that it is not optimal for the agent to become perfectly informed as this would reduce the expected information rent. Considering the principal Kaya (2010 ), Nosal (2006 ), and Bedard (2013 show that acquiring information may not be valuable for the principal as it leads to signalling costs in the contracting stage. Our model replicates this result as we show that the incentives of the principal to get informed depend on the information the agent has. The better the agent is informed the higher are the incentives of the principal to get informed as well as this allows him to appropriate the agent's information rent. Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998) as well as Crémer and Khalil (1994) examine the incentives of a principal to induce an agent to acquire additional information. In contrast to our model they assume that information gathering takes place after the principal has designed the contracts he offers, but before the agent decides, which contract to sign. We follow Kaya (2010) and Kessler (1998) by assuming that decisions about information acquisition are made prior to the contracting stage and that these decisions are observable. However, we allow both players to gather information and focus on the strategic interdependencies of these decisions.
The literature on information gathering within a supply chain can be classified in terms of who acquires the information and how the information is used within the supply chain. Guo and Iyer (2010) analyse the case, in which an upstream manufacturer can gather information on consumers' perceived product fit. They observe that the manufacturer does not have an incentive to be fully informed even if it is free of charge. This correlates with one of our equilibria where the supplier does not want to be informed. However, they model the information stage in another way. The information acquisition takes place after contracting with a retailer and is affected by different information sharing mechanisms.
In contrast to this, there are several papers, which consider a downstream retailer/buyer investing in forecasting of demand or other uncertain parameters. Shin and Tunca (2010) show that if there is competition between retailers, the incentives of these retailers to invest in information acquisition are such that overinvestment occurs. If the investment is secret the overinvestment can be resolved by market-based contracts, while in case of observable investments a uniform-price auction is required to solve that issue. Closer to our model is the structure in Fu and Zhu (2010) , where a single retailer acquires costly demand information after contract negotiations, but before ordering quantities. In their model, the added information might lead the informed party to improve its profits at the supplier's expense. They suggest a sharing mechanism for the cost and the information in order for the added information to lead to a Pareto-improvement. Guo (2009) addresses the question of forced versus voluntary disclosure of information and the effects of the disclosure rules on the firms' profits. It is shown that while forced disclosure actually harms the informed retailer and benefits the uninformed supplier, voluntary disclosure might restore the retailer's incentives to get informed in the first place.
Treating a similar problem, Kurtulus, Ülük, and Toktay (2011) allow both the supplier and the retailer to invest in more accurate information about demand. They focus on potential profit losses implied by production decisions of the supplier and either too low or high orders of the retailer. The aim of their paper is to analyse the benefits of information sharing, i. e., of common demand forecasts by the supplier and the retailer. For this purpose Kurtulus, Ülük, and Toktay (2011) consider risk sharing based on buy back clauses.
The papers above do not analyse whether the decisions on the information stage are strategic complements or substitutes. Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) look at a financial market and show that learning can be a strategic complement. This contradicts Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , who show that learning is a strategic substitute. However, both papers only take a horizontal relation into account. Our paper contributes to the literature, as it considers a comparative static analysis of the information decision in a supply chain and explains the existence of two different types of equilibria.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is concerned with the model framework. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium contracts offered by the supplier for any given combination of private signals and precision choices. The decisions on information acquisition are analysed in Section 4. Section 5 presents a discussion of some of the model's structural assumptions. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Model
We consider a three-stage game with one supplier, one retailer and uncertain market conditions. In the first stage both players ∈ { , } can simultaneously choose the level of precision of their signals about the actual market condition. While the selected signal precisions are observable, the signals themselves are private information. In the second stage, the supplier designs a menu of contracts, which he offers to the retailer. Then, the retailer chooses one of the contracts and offers the respective quantity on the market. The profit of the supplier is the transfer paid by the retailer minus the cost of producing the quantity specified in the contract, which has been chosen by the retailer. The retailer's profit is this quantity times the market price for the good, minus the transfer paid to the supplier.
The retailer faces a perfectly competitive market. To capture uncertainty about market conditions, we assume that the market price for the product is ∈ { , } with = 1, = and 1/2 < < 1. 1 We further assume that the commonly known probabilities for the high and the low price are
Allowing for different prior probabilities would complicate the analysis without leading to qualitatively different results. At the end of the first stage both players get private signals ∈ { , } about the actual market price. Each player may choose his signal precision ∈ [1/2, ] with 1/2 < ≤ 1, without any cost. 2 The probabilities for getting a correct signal are given by
Correspondingly, the probabilities for getting a wrong signal are given by
Note that = 1/2 implies that firm is completely uninformed. As mentioned, we assume that and are observable while the signals themselves are private information.
Turning to the second stage, the supplier chooses the menu of contracts that he offers. Each contract entails a fixed payment and a quantity , which is produced by the supplier at a cost of
Since we assume that this decision takes place after the supplier has received his private signal, the offered menu is conditioned on the supplier's signal
, the supplier's signal is not informative. Then the contracts he offers do not depend on and correspond to pooling contracts, which do not signal any private information. On the other hand, > 1/2 leads to separating contracts ≠ which in turn allows the retailer to update his beliefs about the state of demand. More precisely, given signal and the corresponding contract offer , the conditional probability that signal = reflects the true state of the world ∈ { , } can be written as
Our solution concept is the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, focusing on equilibria in pure strategies. To decrease the potentially high number of equilibria we make the following additional assumptions: Off equilibrium the retailer assumes that the supplier's signal is = . Following the intuitive criterion we further assume that menu offer induces the retailer to belief = , only if the supplier would not be better off by offering than , if his signal was . In the next section, we characterize the equilibrium contracts. We then turn to the supplier's and retailer's decisions on signal precision in the first stage of the game.
Equilibrium Contracts
We start with the case in which the signal of the supplier is = and then turn to = . If = , the supplier offers = ( , ). The expected profit of the retailer, if he chooses contract ( , ) with ∈ { , }, can be written as
Since Π ( ) and Π ( ) satisfy the single crossing property, the binding constraints for the optimal incentive compatible contracts and are given by
The expected profit of the supplier given his signal was = can be written as
Maximizing eq. (2) subject to eq. (1) we get:
Note that quantities * and * entail the standard result of an optimal quantity for the "high type", i. e., = , and a downward distorted quantity for the "low type", i. e., = . While a retailer with = is able to make profit Π ( ) ≥ 0, a retailer with = is left with 0 profit as it is depicted in eq. (1). With = , the supplier offers = ( , ) and the retailer's expected profits are given by
Again, the single crossing property holds and the binding constraints are given by
The expected profit of a supplier with = can be written as
In contrast to the case with = , offering has to be credible, i. e., observing the retailer must be convinced that the supplier's signal was = . Credibly signalling = increases the retailer's belief that = 1 and thus his willingness-to-pay. To ensure credibility the menu has to satisfy the following constraint
Using eqs (3) and (5), we can show that there exists a uniquẽ( , ) ∈ (0, 1) such that eq. (5) 
Proof See appendix. ■ Note that * and̂ * correspond to the quantities for regular screening contracts and respectively. While * is undistorted, there is some distortion in̂ * for any < 1. In addition, Δ * < 0 specifies the smallest additional downward distortion required for eq. (5) to hold, if ≤̃( , ). Intuitively, to ensure credibility of having received = , the supplier has to decrease the quantity as this lowers his profits, if the retailer gets signal = and therefore chooses -an event which is more unlikely with = as compared to = . Thus, the increase in distortion of * allows the supplier to credibly signal = , as the expected profit of * would be reduced significantly, if = . Figure 1 shows̃( , ) for = 1/2 and = 2/3. Note that lim ↘0.5̃( , ) = lim ↗1̃( , ) = 1. Thus, for being either rather high or low, additional distortion is required even for relatively high values of . Note further that we have * ≠ * , if ≠ 1/2 and l →1/2 ( * − * ) = 0. Thus, = 1/2 leads to pooling contracts, which do not require the additional distortion to solve the supplier's credibility problem. On the other hand = 1 resolves all uncertainty for the supplier, but still requires additional distortion to credibly signal = to a retailer, who is less then perfectly informed. 
Choice of Signal Precision
Turning to the first stage of the game, the expected profits of the supplier Π and the retailer Π can be written as
Regarding the shape of these profit functions, we get the following result for the retailer: 
Finally, we have Π ( , )/ < 0, if , , are such that * =̂ * = with > 0 but small.
Proof See appendix. ■
The first part of the lemma implies that for = 1/2, the retailer's best response is not to be as informed as possible. This is simply due to the fact that the downward distortions of the quantities * and * are increasing in which impacts the retailer's expected profit negatively. The second part of Lemma 3 indicates that̃( , ) may be part of an equilibrium, if the kink of Π ( , ) is such that its left side is upward, while the right side is downward sloping. The final part guarantees that the retailer's best response never leads tô * = 0, as the retailer would rather reduce the precision of his signal in order to prevent such an extreme distortion.
Turning to the supplier, we get:
Lemma 4 The supplier's incentives for information acquisition are characterized by
Furthermore, Π ( , ) is strictly convex in for all , such that * > 0.
Proof See appendix. ■
Proof guarantees by convexity of Π ( , ) that the supplier either chooses to get not informed at all or as much as possible. Intuitively, starting with = 1/2 an increase in forces the supplier to reduce * in order to satisfy the credibility constraint, which offsets any potential gains from being better informed. If and are sufficiently high, the credibility constraint is not binding and the supplier can fully benefit from signalling his information. Thus, if >̃( , ), the supplier has an incentive to be as informed as possible. Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose = 1. Then, there exist multiple equilibria with * = 1 and * sufficiently high.
Proof See appendix. ■ If = 1, i. e., if players can choose to be perfectly informed, the supplier is able to extract the entire rent from the retailer by choosing * = 1 and the appropriate contracts. Thus, Π ( , 1) = 0, while for the supplier it holds that
If we restrict < 1, the analysis of the equilibrium choices * and * is more involved since we have to distinguish whether is lower or higher theñ( , ). Furthermore, we now get that two types of equilibria may coexist. Proposition 2 Assume < 1. Then, there exist 1 ( ), 2 ( ) ∈ (1/2, 1) and two types of equilibria characterized by:
ii. If ≥ 2 ( ), * * = and * * = min{max{̃( , ), The proposition states that -depending on the maximum precision -we either get an equilibrium, where the supplier decides to stay uninformed, or an equilibrium, where the supplier wants to be informed as much as possible. The two types of equilibria show two different strategies for the supplier to cope with the credibility problem discussed above. When the retailer is not able to get well informed ( low), the supplier can refuse to get informed at all, as the distortion from the retailer's information is low and the credibility problem can thus be avoided by offering pooling contracts. When the retailer can get well informed ( high), the information rent is relatively high. Therefore, it is beneficial for the supplier to offer separating contracts, despite the required additional distortion of * . The graphs of 1 ( ) and 2 ( ) are shown in Figure 2 . Note that we have 1 ( ) > 2 ( ) for sufficiently small, while Π (1/2, * * ) = Π ( , * * ) and * * = lead to 1 ( ) = 2 ( ) for sufficiently high. Note also that for sufficiently small , both types of equilibria exist. This is due to the complementarity of the decisions on signal precision. Consider for example = 0.79 and two different values of . With = 1/2 we get ′ = 3/4 < * * = : As is small, the effect of on the quantities is large and a high would thus imply highly distorted quantities * , ∈ { , }. This leads the retailer to choose a low . If the retailer chooses = ′ , the supplier's best response is to stay uninformed, which represents the first type of equilibrium. On the other hand, with * * = the retailer's information rent is already high enough to induce the supplier to get informed as well. Hence, the two types of equilibria coexist. With = 2/3 we have ′ = 11/12 > * * = : As is large, the effect of on the quantities is small and a high leads to less distortion and the retailer has a stronger incentive to choose a high . This induces the supplier to choose = . Thus, the first type of equilibrium does not exist. To illustrate different types of equilibria, assume that = 2/3. Then, starting with = 1/2 + as ≤ 1 (2/3), we have an equilibrium, with * = 1/2 and * = until = 1 (2/3) = 2 (2/3). If 2 (2/3) ≤ <̃( , 2/3), we have the equilibrium with both players acquiring as much information as possible, i. e., * * = and * * = .
For̃( , 2/3) ≤ < 1, we get that * * = and * * =̃( , 2/3). Finally, if = 1, we get the equilibria specified in Lemma 1. The corresponding equilibrium values * , * as well as * * , * * are shown in Figure 3 . 
Discussion
In this section, we discuss variations of three structural assumptions of our model. First, we allow the supplier to get his signal verified and address the question, whether the supplier wants to disclose his signal to the verification process. Second, we modify the game such that the supplier designs the contracts before learning his private signal. Afterwards, the supplier receives his private signal, which he may report to the retailer before the retailer chooses one of the contracts. Third, we analyse the game when either the retailer or the supplier decides first on the precision of their signals. We retain our main assumptions about the observability of these decisions.
Verifiable Signals
Assume that in contrast to the model above the supplier's signal is verifiable. Then -as in the case of signals being public information -the supplier does not face the credibility problem, which is discussed above. This would lead to standard adverse selection results in our model. Now further assume that there is a chance that the supplier did not receive any signal and it is thus credible for him to pretend not to have received private information, even if he did. The credibility problem is now a different one. A supplier with an signal would always want to disclose his private information. As the signal can be verified a supplier with an signal can offer standard adverse selection contracts, as there is no additional credibility condition to be satisfied. However, a supplier with an signal would want to pretend to have not received any signal, as the regular pooling contracts offer a higher profit, than the separating contracts, given an signal is revealed. This requires the pooling contracts, which are offered by a supplier, who really did not receive any signal to distort the quantity for a retailer with an signal such that it is no longer favourable for a supplier with an signal to pretend that he did not receive any private information. This additional distortion makes it credible for the supplier without a signal that he did not receive an signal. Thus, the supplier without a signal faces a similar problem as the supplier with an signal in our main model.
Concerning the supplier's decision to get informed, we find that -compared to the main model -he decides to stay uninformed for relatively high . This allows the supplier to avoid the risk of receiving no signal, which would require him to offer distorted pooling contracts, while he can offer regular pooling contracts, if he does not acquire any information.
Contract Predesign
Assume that the supplier is allowed to design the contracts before he learns his signal and can thereby commit to specific menus of contracts. After the contracts are fixed and the supplier has learned his signal, he may report it to the retailer and offer the respective menu.
First, assume that is sufficiently small such that the information rent from being informed is so small that the supplier does not have an incentive to get informed. Then, the supplier will choose * = 1 2 and design pooling contracts as before.
Second, assume that is sufficiently large such that the supplier wants to offer separating contracts. Then, he can design 2 different contracts for each signal he might receive later. In order for the report of his signal and the associated offer to be credible, the contracts have to be incentive compatible to guarantee credibility of the supplier's report in the same way, as in the model above. As there are only 2 states of the world and the signal report has to be credible, the supplier will offer the ex-post optimal contracts. Hence, the possibility to commit to ex-ante designed contracts is not valuable to the supplier. Such commitment power might be valuable to the supplier, if there were for instance three possible states of the world. Then the supplier could find it optimal to pool two of the states ex-ante and still have contracts, which guarantee a credible report of his signal (see for instance Kessler 1998 , who finds such a "semi-separating" equilibrium in a principal-agent model with three states of the world).
Sequential Decisions
Assume that the retailer selects the precision of his signal first and that the supplier observes this decision. Since the supplier's profit function is convex in (see Lemma 4), he either chooses = 1/2 or = . Comparing the retailer's profits for = 1/2 and = reveals
which implies that the retailer wants to choose such that it induces the supplier to choose = 1 2
. We can define a critical , with
, whenever feasible:
Using the definition of * in Proposition 2 we therefore get that in the sequential move game, where the retailer decides first, the equilibrium is characterized by = 1/2 and = min{ * , }. Thus, the retailer prefers the pooling contracts, whenever feasible, as the supplier can extract more rent, if he offers separating contracts. In addition, the downward distortion required to solve the supplier's credibility problem is avoided, if pooling contracts are used. Now assume that the supplier decides first on his signal precision. Using the retailer's best response ∈ { * , * * } and analysing the supplier's maximization problem, we get that in the sequential move game, where the supplier decides first, the equilibrium is characterized by = 1/2 for and sufficiently small; otherwise the supplier chooses = . The intuition is analogous to the main model, where the supplier has to decide, if he wants to avoid the credibility problem by choosing = 1/2 or if he wants to solve it by distorting * .
In the latter case, the supplier chooses = . However, if is sufficiently small such that 1 ( ) > 2 ( ) (as in Figure 2 ), the supplier is now able to select the equilibrium, which he prefers. In our model this leads the supplier to choose = 1/2. Thus, if the supplier decides first, pooling contracts are offered more often.
Conclusion
We have analysed the incentives of a supplier and a retailer to acquire more accurate information about actual market conditions. Using a simple model we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements and that the supplier chooses to get informed, only if the information of the retailer is sufficiently precise even though the cost of information acquisition is 0. If the maximum signal precision is sufficiently high, the retailer's information rent from acquiring additional information is relatively high as well. Thus, the supplier has stronger incentives to get informed as well and appropriate some of the information rent. If the maximum signal precision is sufficiently small, the retailer's information rent is rather small too. Thus, it becomes more attractive for the supplier to solve the credibility problem, which he faces, if he receives a signal for a high price, by not being informed and choosing pooling contracts. 
Proof of Lemma 1 Solving
Hence, the optimal quantity * is given by * = + (1 − ) 
where Φ( , , ) is given by
Solving Φ( , , ) = 0 for shows that there exists a unique solutioñ( , ) ∈ [1/2, 1] and that
To determine the optimal quantity for <̃( , ), note that 
we know by symmetry of the functions that the optimal distortion Δ * is given by
Hence, it holds that * <̂ * , whenever <̃( , ). Figure 2 .
Proof of Lemma 3

Proof of Proposition 2 Using Lemma 4 we can prove the first part of the proposition by comparing the supplier's profits
